Model uncertainty has the potential to change importantly how monetary policy should be conducted, making it an issue that central banks cannot ignore. In this paper, I use a standard new Keynesian business cycle model to analyze the behavior of a central bank that conducts policy with discretion while fearing that its model is misspeci…ed. My main results are as follows. First, policy performance can be improved if the discretionary central bank implements a robust policy. This important result is obtained because the central bank's desire for robustness directs it to assertively stabilize in ‡ation, thereby mitigating the stabilization bias associated with discretionary policymaking. In e¤ect, a fear of model uncertainty can act similarly to a commitment mechanism. Second, exploiting the connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion, I show that the central bank's fear of model misspeci…cation leads it to forecast future outcomes under the belief that in ‡ation (in particular) will be persistent and have large unconditional variance, raising the probability of extreme outcomes. Private agents, however, anticipating the policy response, make decisions under the belief that in ‡ation will be more closely stabilized, that is, more tightly distributed, than under rational expectations. Third, as a technical contribution, I show how to solve an important class of linear-quadratic robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problems.
Introduction
It is the nature of models to simplify reality. Unfortunately, this simpli…cation goes hand- Households smooth consumption relative to a habit stock, saving or borrowing against future income through the purchase or sale of one-period nominal bonds. Firms set prices to maximize pro…ts, subject to a Calvo-style adjustment cost and in ‡ation indexation. The central bank conducts policy with discretion, setting the return on the one-period nominal bond to optimize a policy loss function de…ned over macroeconomic aggregates, such as in ‡ation and consumption.
To introduce model uncertainty, I follow Hansen and Sargent (2007) and assume that the central bank is skeptical of its model, fearing that it may be distorted by speci…cation errors.
Thus, the central bank in the economy I analyze designs policy while seeking robustness to unstructured perturbations about its approximating, or reference, model. 1 Importantly, in my analysis the central bank formulates its robust policy while taking into account that the distortions it fears also a¤ect how private agents form expectations, similar to Woodford (2005) .
Although I employ robust control techniques, I take advantage of results in Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) and Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006) that relate the multiple models in robust control to the multiple priors in uncertainty aversion (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) to reinterpret the solution to the robust control problem. A connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion arises because the worst-case speci…cation errors that emerge in the solution to the robust control problem manifest themselves in the form of worst-case shock processes. These worst-case shock processes can be interpreted as a set of worst-case beliefs, or a worst-case prior over future states, that is distorted relative to rational expectations.
An important result that emerges from my analysis is that robustness need not entail a decline in policy performance. To the contrary, a central bank that implements a robust policy may actually improve policy performance, and not just in extreme, low-probability states of nature, but on average. Although this result may seem surprising on the surface, it has a clear and intuitive explanation. When expectations are rational, time-inconsistency leads to a welfare-lowering stabilization bias in which in ‡ation is understabilized and consumption is overstabilized relative to the Ramsey (commitment) policy .
To the extent that a fear of model uncertainty directs the discretionary central bank to stabilize in ‡ation more tightly, the desire for robustness can mitigate the stabilization bias and potentially raise welfare. Ordinarily, of course, a concern for reputation (Barro and Gordon, 1983) , an optimal contract (Walsh, 1995) , the appointment of an optimally conservative central banker (Rogo¤, 1985) , or the strategic delegation of policy objectives by a benevolent authority (Walsh, 2003 ) is required to improve on discretionary policymaking, but with robustness it is a malevolent planner that strategically designs the model (not the policy objectives), and the actions of the malevolent planner arise endogenously to re ‡ect not the central bank's desire to raise welfare, but rather its fear of model misspeci…cation.
My analysis also demonstrates that a central bank's fear of misspeci…cation can distort importantly -and asymmetrically -its beliefs about likely future economic outcomes and the beliefs that private agents hold. Thus, where the central bank's worst-case beliefs emphasize the possibility that in ‡ation may be persistent and have a large unconditional variance, anticipating the policy response, private agents'beliefs emphasize that in ‡ation will be more closely stabilized, and more tightly distributed, than under rational expectations. In addition, because the central bank's worst-case beliefs assign greater probability to the tails of the in ‡ation and consumption distributions than rational expectations do, and because outcomes in the tails of these distributions come at a disproportionately high cost, the robust policy responds more forcefully to shocks than the nonrobust policy and generates greater interest rate volatility as a consequence. For this reason, the central bank's fear of model misspeci…cation can have important e¤ects on policy outcomes. 
The model
To illustrate how a fear of model misspeci…cation can a¤ect policy, I use a simple hybrid new Keynesian business cycle model as a laboratory. The model contains equations explaining in ‡ation, t , and consumption, c t , as a function of the short-term nominal interest rate, i t , and two serially correlated shocks, s t and d t , and can be written as
Equation (1) describes a hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve in which forward-dynamics arise through sticky prices and backward-dynamics enter through in ‡ation indexation. The parameter 2 0; 1 2 governs the importance of forward-looking expectations in price-setting, equaling zero under Calvo-pricing (Calvo, 1983) , 2 (0; 1) represents the subjective discount factor, and 2 (0; 1), the coe¢ cient on consumption, is a function of the share of …rms that set their price optimally each period. Equation (2) summarizes consumption behavior in an environment in which consumers have external habit formation (Abel, 1990) . The parameter 2 0; 1 2 regulates the importance of habits while 2 (0; 1), the coe¢ cient on the ex ante real interest rate, denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Supply and demand shocks, s t and d t , described by equations (3) and (4), respectively, each follow …rst-order autoregressive processes in which f ; g 2 (0; 1) and f " ; g 2 (0; 1), with the innovations
The short-term nominal interest rate, i t , serves as the central bank's policy instrument.
I assume that the central bank conducts policy with discretion, that it chooses fi t g 1 t=0 , and that its policy objective function, which it seeks to minimize, takes the form
where 2 [0; 1) and 2 (0; 1).
The monetary policy transmission mechanism largely operates as follows. Through price rigidity a rise in the nominal interest rate raises the ex ante real interest rate, which lowers current period demand as households seek to defer consumption. Responding to lower demand, …rms that can change their price moderate their price increase, which damps in ‡a-tion. Monetary policy also operates through in ‡ation expectations, with higher interest rates lowering in ‡ation expectations and, hence, also current in ‡ation.
Although the model is stylized, its usefulness resides in the fact that it is simple enough to be easily understood, yet rich enough to illustrate the importance robustness plays in shaping policy and economic outcomes. for an equilibrium -the approximating equilibrium-in which the leader employs a policy designed strategically to guard against model misspeci…cation, while the followers, who do not fear model misspeci…cation, make decisions and form expectations using the approximating model, taking the leader's desire for robustness into account.
The problem
The economy consists of a Stackelberg leader, such as a central bank, a …scal authority, or, more generally, a government, and one or more followers, such as households, …rms, and other private agents. Both the leader and the followers are assumed to share an approximating model 3 that they believe comes closest to describing the economy. According to this approximating model, an n 1 vector of endogenous variables, z t , consisting of n 1 predetermined variables, x t , and n 2 (n 2 = n n 1 ) non-predetermined variables, y t , evolves over time according to
where u t is a p 1 vector of policy control variables, " t i:i:d: [0; I ns ] is an n s 1 (n s n 1 )
vector of white-noise innovations, and E t is the private sector's mathematical expectations operator conditional upon period t information. The matrices A 11 , A 12 , A 21 , A 22 , B 1 , and B 2 are conformable with x t , y t , and u t , as necessary, and contain the structural parameters that govern preferences and technology. The matrix C 1 is determined to ensure that " t has the identity matrix as its variance-covariance matrix.
If the approximating model is known to be correctly speci…ed, 4 then the leader's problem is to choose its control variables fu t g 1 0 to minimize
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and, recall, z t
, subject to equations (1) and (2), Markov-perfection, and a known x 0 , where the weighting matrices, W and R, are assumed to be positive semide…nite and positive de…nite, respectively, and where the pair
) is assumed to be stabilizable (Kwakernaak and Sivan, 1972 , chapter 6). 5 However, although the approximating model describes most accurately the economy's structure, the leader is skeptical of the model, fearing that it may be misspeci…ed. Moreover, the leader fears that private agents use the distorted model to form expectations. 6 To accommodate its fear, the leader introduces a vector of speci…cation errors, v t+1 , and surrounds the approximating model with the class of distorted models
where the sequence of speci…cation errors, fv t+1 g 1 0 , is restricted to satisfy the boundedness constraint
To guard against the speci…cation errors that it fears, the leader formulates policy subject to the distorted model and takes the position that the speci…cation errors will be as damaging as possible, a position operationalized through the metaphor that fv t+1 g 1 0 is chosen by a …ctitious evil agent whose objectives are diametrically opposed to those of the leader. Accordingly, the leader's robust problem is to choose fu t g 1 0 to minimize equation (8) and for the evil agent to choose fv t+1 g 1 0 to maximize equation (8) , subject to equations (9), (10) , and (11) and a known x 0 . The evil agent's role in this problem is simply to help the leader devise a robust policy. Following Hansen and Sargent (2007, chapter 2), the way forward is to apply the Luenberger (1969) Lagrange multiplier theorem to replace this constraint problem, involving equation (11), with an equivalent multiplier problem.
Recognizing that the state vector is given by x t , and that on the stable manifold the nonpredetermined variables, y t , must be a linear function of the state vector, x t , I conjecture that the followers'expectations of future non-predetermined variables are given by
where H is yet to be determined. Substituting equation (12) into equation (10) and combining the resulting expression with equation (9) yields
Now, given the leader's fear that the followers use the distorted model to form expectations, implying E t v t+1 6 = 0, and the fact that the speci…cation errors are measurable with respect to period t information, implying E t v t+1 = v t+1 , equation (13) leads to
where
Equation (14) describes the behavior of the state variables, while equation (15) (15) to eliminate the non-predetermined variables from the policy loss function. Following this substitution, recognizing that the value function takes the form V (x t ) = x 0 t Vx t +d, writing the optimization problem recursively, and applying Luenberger's Lagrange multiplier theorem, the leader's robust multiplier problem can be written as
where e u t u t v t+1 and where
2 [ ; 1), subject to equation (14) and a known x 0 . Because the objectives of the leader and the evil agent are perfectly misaligned (they play a zero-sum game), the solution to this minmax problem can be obtained by solving the simultaneous choice problem (Hansen and Sargent, 2007, chapter 7). The …rst-order condition with respect to e u t for the simultaneous choice problem gives rise to the decision rule
with the value function and the solution for the non-predetermined variables, y t , updated according to
respectively. The equations above provide the basis for calculating numerically the worst case equilibrium, the vehicle through which the approximating equilibrium is obtained.
Worst-case equilibrium
In the worst-case equilibrium, re ‡ecting the leader's worst-case fears, the approximating model is misspeci…ed according to the worst-case distortion and the followers use the distorted model to form expectations. To obtain the worst-case equilibrium, I solve for the …x-point of equations (16) through (20), (23) through (25), and (27) through (29) ; then the law of motion for the state variables, the non-predetermined variables, the leader's control variables, and the worst-case speci…cation errors are given by
respectively.
Approximating equilibrium
In the approximating equilibrium, although the leader employs its robust decision rule, the approximating model is not misspeci…ed and the followers, who are not robust decisionmakers, form expectations using the approximating model. The …rst step in obtaining the approximating equilibrium is to solve for the worst-case equilibrium, which supplies the leader's robust decision rule. Then, in a second step, I solve for the …x-point of
The solution to this second …x-point problem recovers how the followers' expectations are formed. Then, in the approximating equilibrium, the state variables, the non-predetermined variables, and the leader's control variables are given by
respectively. 7 7 Alternatively, in many instances the approximating equilibrium can be obtained by solving
for its rational expectations equilibrium. Where the rational expectations equilibrium is unique, the relationship between yt and xt and the law of motion for the state variables obtained by solving this equation are given by equations (37) and (38), respectively.
Robustness and uncertainty aversion
The law of motion for the state variables in the worst-case equilibrium, equation (30) , can be re-expressed as
Thus, the worst-case law of motion for the state variables is one in which the shock processes appear distorted, with their conditional mean twisted, or slanted, relative to the approximating model.
Equation (40) suggests a connection between robust control and the maxmin expected utility framework developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to describe behavior they refer to as uncertainty aversion. 8 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to minimize, and an evil agent chooses point-wise the probabilities in the probability density function, p (x t+1 jx t ), associated with the expectations operator, E t , to maximize
subject to
Markov-perfection, and a known x 0 . In addition, the di¤erence between the distorted conditional probability density function, p (x t+1 jx t ), and the rational expectations conditional probability density function, p (x t+1 jx t ), is constrained to satisfy
where ! in equation (44) plays the same role as in equation (11). 9 Of course, it must also be the case that R
p (x t+1 jx t ) dx t+1 = 1; 8 x t 2 < n 2 . Equation (44) is a (discounted) relative entropy condition (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) , in which the expectation of a (log-) likelihood ratio is taken with respect to a distorted probability density.
The connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion suggests an alternative interpretation of the worst-case equilibrium. In an important sense, the worst-case equilib- Before introducing robustness, it is useful to construct a benchmark by solving the nondistorted problem in which all expectations are formed rationally. For the parameterization provided earlier, the central bank's optimal discretionary policy can be described by the statecontingent decision rule 10 i t = 5:180s t + 6:133d t + 0:937 t 1 + 0:800c t 1 :
The optimal policy is to raise the nominal interest rate in response to adverse supply shocks and stimulatory demand shocks, thereby mitigating their contemporaneous impact on in ‡ation and consumption, and to tighten policy in response to (past) higher in ‡ation and consumption, thereby returning the economy to steady state more quickly. A notable feature of equation (45) is that its feedback coe¢ cients are large, revealing aggressive policy responses even under rational expectations. 11 
Robustness
To introduce robustness a value for must be provided. Following standard practice, I set to generate a particular detection error probability, here 0:1. s t+1 = 0:545s t + 0:038d t + 0:007 t 1 + 0:004c t 1 + " t ;
d t+1 = 0:041s t + 0:544d t + 0:007 t 1 + 0:005c t 1 + t :
These worst-case shock processes can be interpreted two ways. One interpretation is that they convey information about the location and behavior of speci…cation errors that the central bank should be concerned about. According to this interpretation, the central bank is concerned that the demand and supply shocks may exhibit greater serial correlation than the approximating model asserts, that the demand and supply shocks might be correlated, and that the Phillips curve and the consumption Euler equation may omit terms involving lags of consumption and in ‡ation. By revealing aspects of the model's structure to which monetary policy is particularly sensitive, the worst-case shock processes indicate areas of the model to which the central bank should devote resources to ensure that the speci…cation is appropriate.
An alternative interpretation is that the worst-case shock processes reveal how the central bank's expectation operator is twisted, or slanted, by its fear of misspeci…cation. According to this interpretation, the probability density function associated with the worst-case equilibrium describes how the central bank forms expectations and how it fears that private agents form expectations. Similarly, the probability density function associated with the approximating equilibrium describes how households and …rms form expectations in the absence of misspeci…cation, potentially di¤ering from rational expectations through the in ‡uence of the central bank's robust policy. Note that the probability density function that the central bank employs does not coincide with the economy's data generating process in the approximating equilibrium, re ‡ecting the central bank's enduring pessimism about its model. This interpretation exploits the connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion, and focuses attention on the probability density functions that underlie beliefs and expectation formation. It is the properties of these beliefs, represented by probability density functions, that I characterize and discuss in the remainder of this section. 
the interest rate's worst-case distribution also exhibits a much greater unconditional variance than the rational expectations distribution. Essentially, in terms of its unconditional expectations operator, the central bank obtains robustness by overweighting the probability it attaches to extreme in ‡ation (in particular) and consumption outcomes, and this leads to an interest rate distribution that also assigns greater probability to extreme interest rate outcomes.
The central bank's desire to guard against extreme outcomes has important implications for the approximating equilibrium. By designing policy to guard against extreme in ‡ation outcomes, the robust policy has a strong damping e¤ect on the distribution of in ‡ation (especially) and consumption in the approximating equilibrium. As shown in panel C, in the approximating equilibrium, in ‡ation is distributed much more tightly about its unconditional mean than when expectations are rational, illustrating how the central bank's fear of misspeci…cation leads it to "overstabilize" in ‡ation. Similarly, the robust central bank also "overstabilizes"
consumption (panel D), but at the cost of greater interest rate volatility (panel E).
Although the unconditional probability densities displayed in Figure 1 reveal the relationship between the central bank's pessimism and the probability it assigns to extreme outcomes, because they are unconditional they do not reveal how model uncertainty twists, or slants, the central bank's conditional expectations operator. To this end, for a given initial state, 14 Figure 2 presents the marginal probability density functions used to form one-quarter-ahead forecasts. Figure 2 shows that the worst-case density for in ‡ation is slanted to the right, with the central bank fearing higher in ‡ation outcomes, and that the worst-case density for consumption is slanted to the left, with the central bank fearing lower consumption outcomes. Although it may seem more intuitive for the central bank to fear higher consumption outcomes, which would be in ‡ationary, the probability densities are not unconstrained. Through the structure of the approximating model, because the central bank pessimistically expects higher in ‡ation outcomes, it also expects higher interest rate outcomes, which leads it to expect lower consumption outcomes.
Notice, however, that, unlike for consumption and the interest rate, where the distorted probability density function for future in ‡ation is right-slanted, its counterpart in the approximating equilibrium is left-slanted.
Because the distribution of in ‡ation is especially interesting and relevant, particularly since the central bank's role in the economy is to provide in ‡ation with a nominal anchor, Figure 3 examines the probability density function for in ‡ation at di¤erent forecast horizons. the worst-case equilibrium, and the approximating equilibrium. For the worst-case equilibrium, panel A illustrates the extent to which the central bank's pessimism shifts rightward the one-quarter-ahead forecast density relative to rational expectations. However, this rightward shift, which raises the probability the central bank assigns to higher in ‡ation outcomes, is evident in panels A to C. Equally evident in Figure 3 is the fact that the probability density functions associated with the approximating equilibrium, relative to rational expectations, are shifted to the left. The central bank's robust policy, which attaches pessimistically large probabilities to extreme in ‡ation outcomes, skews in ‡ation's distribution downward in the approximating equilibrium. As the forecast horizon lengthens, however, the distortions to in‡ation's conditional mean weaken and the conditional probability density function converges to the unconditional probability density function. In fact, in ‡ation's conditional probability density function at the …ve-year horizon ( Figure 3 , panel D) essentially coincides with the unconditional probability density function shown in Figure 1 , panel C. 
Robustness, detectability, and policy loss
where L d ap denotes policy loss in the approximating equilibrium and L d re denotes policy loss in the rational expectations equilibrium. Panel A reveals that the probability of making a detection error is monotonically increasing in the robustness parameter, . Underlying this result is the fact that, as increases, greater weight is placed on the approximating model as being correct, the worst-case distortions are more tightly constrained, and the robust policy converges to the rational expectations policy. As a consequence, in the limit as " 1, data generated from the approximating equilibrium look increasingly like those generated from the rational expectations equilibrium and the probability of making a detection error converges to 15 What panel B reveals is that the central bank's desire for robustness actually causes policy loss to decline, not rise. In e¤ect, even if speci…cation errors are absent, the central bank is better o¤ using the robust policy than using the rational expectations policy.
Although this result may seem surprising at …rst, its genesis lies in the fact that monetary policy is conducted with discretion rather than with commitment. 16 Because private agents are forward-looking, the time-consistent policy with rational expectations is not optimalit does not coincide with the optimal commitment policy -and other policies exist whose performance more closely approaches that of the optimal commitment policy.
As document, in rational expectations models discretionary policies overstabilize consumption and understabilize in ‡ation, relative to commitment policies, giving rise to a stabilization bias. This bias can be unwound by stabilizing in ‡ation more aggressively and stabilizing consumption less aggressively, however the absence of a commitment mechanism makes this infeasible when expectations are rational. But model uncertainty imparts a deviation from rational expectations, which causes the central bank to implement 1 5 Appendix A describes how the policy loss function is evaluated. 1 6 Dennis and Ravenna (2007) obtain a related result from a model in which a central bank conducts policy while learning. The connection between the two results is that in each case policy is conducted with discretion and the central bank is only boundedly rational. a policy that counteracts the likelihood of extreme in ‡ation outcomes, partly mitigating the size of the stabilization bias. At the same time, as Figure 1 shows, the robust policy also stabilizes consumption more aggressively, and, as a consequence, whether robustness raises or lowers policy loss relative to the time-consistent rational expectations policy is likely to be parameter and model dependent, an issue to which I now turn.
The cost of robustness
In the absence of misspeci…cation, the optimal commitment policy is (weakly) superior to all other policies, including robust policies. It follows immediately that a desire for robustness cannot improve policy loss when the central bank can commit. However, as shown above, when policy is conducted with discretion, stabilization bias provides an avenue whereby robust policies can improve upon nonrobust policies. In this section, I investigate the factors that govern this result and show that the …nding that the cost of robustness can be negative holds for a wide range of parameter values.
I begin by presenting a simple model in which the central bank's desire for robustness is detrimental. Let in ‡ation obey the forward-looking new Keynesian Phillips curve
where, as earlier, c t represents the consumption gap and s t i:i:d[0; 2 " ] represents a cost push shock, and let the nonrobust decision problem for the central bank be to choose fc t g 1 0
to minimize
subject to equation (50) and s 0 known. Notice that the decision problem described by equations (50) and (51), which is equivalent to the problem in Woodford (2005) , is a special case of the decision problem that I analyzed in Section 5. To address these questions, I begin by extending the simple Phillips curve (equation (50)) to allow for endogenous in ‡ation inertia and a serially correlated cost-push shock. With these additions, the simple model becomes
with = = 0 as benchmark values. Now, I consider independent variation in the two persistence parameters, and , holding the detection-error probability constant at 0: 25. 17 For this exercise, I vary (separately) between 0:00 and 0:95 and between 0:00 and 0:50, keeping all other parameters at the benchmark values reported above. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 6 alongside a measure of the discretionary stabilization bias, which I construct according to
where L c re denotes policy loss under commitment and L d re denotes policy loss under discretion, both in the absence of robustness. Aside from special cases in which there is no timeconsistency problem, S is unambiguously negative. Because the policy loss associated with the optimal commitment policy with rational expectations cannot be surpassed, equation (54) provides a lower bound for the cost of robustness. shows that adding endogenous persistence to the Phillips curve (raising ) also produces the result that robustness improves policy loss. Together, panels A and B imply that persistence whether the cost of robustness is positive or negative. The detection-error probability was set to 0:25 to ensure that results could be obtained for all parameterizations of the simple model. in the Phillips curve, whether it be endogenous through or exogenous through , is an important factor for the result that robustness can improve policy loss.
Returning to the hybrid new Keynesian model, I now consider independent variations in , , , and , again holding the detection-error probability constant at 0:25. I vary (separately) between 0:00 and 0:95, between 0:00 and 0:95, between 0:00 and 0:50, and between 0:30 and 0:50, keeping the parameters that are not being changed at their benchmark values.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 7 . Second, the cost of robustness and the stabilization bias are strongly correlated, particularly with respect to variation in and . Speci…cally, smaller values for the stabilization bias are associated with smaller values for the cost of robustness. Third, although the cost of robust-ness is generally negative, the cost of robustness generally falls well shy of the stabilization bias, which is to say that while robustness can lower policy loss it is certainly not a complete substitute for a commitment mechanism. Fourth, although the cost of robustness varies with all four of the parameters considered, consistent with Figure 6 , it is most sensitive to variation in , the persistence parameter in the cost-push shock.
Together, the results in Figures 6 and 7 suggest strongly that persistence in in ‡ation, particularly persistence introduced through the cost-push shock, is closely associated with the …nding that robustness can improve policy loss. Figures 6 and 7 also reveal that in ‡ation persistence is a key factor governing the magnitude of the discretionary stabilization bias, consistent with Dennis and Söderström (2007) . Importantly, the result that the cost of robustness is negative appears to hold for a wide range of parameter values in this model, suggesting that it may hold more generally among new Keynesian models, particularly those for which expectations are an important policy channel and the discretionary stabilization bias is large.
Conclusion
In this paper I develop a method for obtaining solutions to robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problems in which the leader fears distortions to private-agents expectations. I apply this solution method to a stylized hybrid new Keynesian business cycle model to examine the e¤ect a concern for model misspeci…cation can have on the behavior and policy decisions of a central bank that conducts policy with discretion. Although I use robust control methods to generate the relevant equilibria, I exploit the connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion to focus my analysis on the properties of the probability densities that households, …rms, and the central bank use to form expectations.
My analysis indicates that a concern for model uncertainty causes the central bank to make decisions on the basis of a distorted conditional expectations operator that emphasizes the possibility that in ‡ation (in particular) and consumption may be more persistent than their approximating model acknowledges. Because the central bank fears that shocks to in ‡ation and consumption will persist, it implements a policy that tends to stabilize in ‡ation and consumption more tightly than the rational expectations policy. Through their e¤ect on in ‡ation, robust policies can improve on nonrobust policies by actually improving policy performance. This result arises because the central bank's concern for robustness moves it to stabilize in ‡ation more tightly than would be credible were expectations rational, and this greater in ‡ation stabilization partly o¤sets the higher variance of in ‡ation associated with the discretionary stabilization bias. As a consequence, in this hybrid new Keynesian model and with discretionary policymaking, some degree of robustness to model uncertainty can be attained without sacri…cing policy performance. Although the result that robustness can improve policy performance in the absence of a commitment mechanism is parameter dependent, it holds for a wide range of parameter values in the hybrid new Keynesian model that I analyze. In fact, the connection between the cost of robustness and the magnitude of the discretionary stabilization bias suggests that robustness is more likely to improve policy performance in models and for parameterizations where the time inconsistency problem is important and the stabilization bias is large.
Appendix A -Evaluating the loss function
Recall that the loss function takes the form 
All of the equilibria considered in the paper can be expressed in the form
Given equations (A2) through (A5), the results in Appendices A1, A2, and A3 of Dennis 
which is invariant to the economy's initial state, x 0 .
